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Bringing Sounds into Use: Thinking of Sounds as Materials and a Sketch 
of Auditory Affordances 
Christopher J. Steenson
*
 and Matthew W. M. Rodger 
School of Psychology, Queen’s University Belfast, United Kingdom 
Abstract: We live in a richly structured auditory environment. From the sounds of cars charging towards us on the street 
to the sounds of music filling a dancehall, sounds like these are generally seen as being instances of things we hear but can 
also be understood as opportunities for action. In some circumstances, the sound of a car approaching towards us can pro-
vide critical information for the avoidance of harm. In the context of a concert venue, sociocultural practices like music 
can equally afford coordinated activities of movement, such as dancing or music making. Despite how evident the behav-
ioral effects of sound are in our everyday experience, they have been sparsely accounted for within the field of psychol-
ogy. Instead, most theories of auditory perception have been more concerned with understanding how sounds are pas-
sively processed and represented and how they convey information of the world, neglecting than how this information can 
be used for anything. Here, we argue against these previous rationalizations, suggesting instead that information is instan-
tiated through use and, therefore, is an emergent effect of a perceiver’s interaction with their environment. Drawing on 
theory from psychology, philosophy and anthropology, we contend that by thinking of sounds as materials, theorists and 
researchers alike can get to grips with the vast array of auditory affordances that we purposefully bring into use when in-
teracting with the environment.  
Keywords: Affordances, auditory perception, dance, ecological psychology, music, sensorimotor coordination. 
TAKING SOUNDS OUT OF THE HEAD 
Understanding the perception of sound and how we in-
teract with auditory information is not an easy task. It is dif-
ficult to conceive an objective way of explaining auditory 
experiences when our perceptions of sound and our inten-
tions surrounding these perceptions, by definition, are sub-
jective mental phenomena. This distinction between the ob-
jective and the subjective, the mental and physical, is a prob-
lem that has dogged psychology generally over its short 
lifespan. Different approaches have been developed to ex-
plain these dichotomies, which have left far reaching impli-
cations on how researchers have approached more specialist 
areas, such as auditory perception. The dominant approaches 
to psychology, such as cognitive- and information process-
ing-based approaches, explain auditory perception as the 
transformation of objective input (energy stimulating recep-
tors) into subjective output (declarative descriptions of, or, 
responses to received input). This process of input-cognition-
output, we argue, falls short of adequately accounting for the 
phenomenology of our experiences with the auditory envi-
ronment.  
In this paper, we instead propose an alternative view to 
auditory perception that can account for the various creative 
ways we can meaningfully use and interact with sounds. 
Drawing on ideas from ecological psychology, this approach 
takes a different form of discourse to conventional cognitive  
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approaches. This can be typified by its commitment to taking 
the meaning of sounds out of the head, and instead, placing 
them within the environment. We believe that in doing so, 
the various skilled ways we interact and coordinate our ac-
tions with the auditory environment can be truly appreciated. 
This distinction between sounds residing in the mind and 
sounds in the environment (and between representational and 
non-representational approaches) to psychology can be 
broadly defined under two different forms of discourse: a 
vertical or horizontal worldview [1, 2]. In the first two sec-
tions of this paper, we aim to show how a vertical worldview 
has, implicitly, left us with a reductive explanation of audi-
tory perception. Disputing this view, we outline how eco-
logical psychology can provide an alternative, horizontal 
take on this phenomenon. Importantly, we also argue that 
ecological psychology can get closer to dealing with the dif-
ficult task of explaining how we can both meaningfully per-
ceive and interact with sounds.  
A vertical worldview [1, 2] is marked by an implicit 
treatment of objects, events and behavior as being made of 
discrete, underlying components. It is a view at home in sci-
entific and philosophical modes of discourse. For example, 
in physics, particles and atoms are understood as the ‘build-
ing blocks’ from which physical objects are constructed. As 
such, everyday objects such as tables and chairs are seen as 
being made up of discrete atomistic parts that make their 
sum. This general way of explaining aspects of the world has 
led to a general approach to scientific theory that places the 
causes of real-world events as being within the phenomena 
of study, made up from discrete parts that create the surface 
activity being experienced. Since the beginnings of psycho-
logical science with William Wundt’s structuralism, these 
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reductive explanations have been a dominant discourse in the 
behavioral sciences as well as the physical sciences.  
Within the study of behavior in psychology, the main 
schools of thought that have taken up this form of discourse 
have been the cognitive/information processing approaches. 
These approaches attempt to explain facets of human thought 
and perception by breaking the observed trait down into 
smaller, mechanistic, parts (much in the same way as tables 
are seen as being made of smaller building blocks like at-
oms). The ‘building block’ of choice for the cognitive scien-
tist in compartmentalizing psychological phenomena has 
been the mental representation (e.g. [3]; see [4] for a discus-
sion of representations). Taking perception as an example, it 
is generally assumed that in order to see or hear, information 
available to the senses must first be processed and sampled 
as points of sense data and (re)represented in the mind before 
something can be meaningfully perceived, inferred and acted 
upon [5, 6]. In line with a vertical worldview, this indirect 
explanation of experience implies that perception and behav-
ior are mediated by the sense-making inner-workings of the 
mind and therefore are caused in a way that is detached from 
the surface activity of the phenomena that is taking place. 
The meaning of a perception and the possible actions we can 
use it for must be dependent on cognition and the learning of 
appropriate responses to previously experienced stimuli  
[6, 7]. 
This vertical form of discourse is also evident in the field 
of auditory perception. In attempting to understand how a 
sound is perceived, research has based explanation on cogni-
tive structures residing in the observers mind. These cogni-
tive structures or modules are said to perform the task of 
indirectly processing incoming sound energy from the air 
medium [8]. Physical dimensions of the sound waves, such 
as its frequency, amplitude and duration are seen as being 
processed and represented as corresponding low-level per-
ceptual dimensions of pitch, loudness and subjective dura-
tion, as well as other purported features such as timbre and 
the perception of space [9, 10]. These perceptual dimensions 
are in turn constructed into holistic and meaningful auditory 
representations with the aid of past auditory experiences 
stored in memory [11]. In taking this stance, most research 
programs have focused on identifying how this transduction 
of physical energy, via auditory receptors, to representation 
in the brain occurs with the creation of things like ‘auditory 
objects’ (see [12]). The fruits of this research are a number 
of general psychophysical laws regarding auditory percep-
tion, such as the nonlinearities that exist for the perception of 
pitch as a function of sound intensity [9].  
While this indirect and compartmentalized explanation of 
auditory perception is successful in explaining how listeners 
“process” low-level dimensions of sound, such as its pitch or 
loudness, it arguably neglects the phenomenology of audi-
tory experience. Therefore, the holistic form of an auditory 
event that we meaningfully perceive has been left obscured. 
Indeed, focusing on the raw input of a sound (as cognitive 
psychologists would put it) is comparable to what Heidegger 
[13] referred to as listening to the “bare sound” (p. 26) of an 
auditory event. Heidegger argued that hearing dynamic 
changes in bare sensations of pitch and loudness are only 
perceived when one actively chooses to abstract away from a 
sound. Instead, Heidegger reasoned that in the immediate 
perception of a sound, we hear things in the world before the 
sensations that make them up. The two main ways of at-
tempting to explain this have come from the (related) ap-
proaches of Gestalt and ecological psychology. The main 
tenant of Gestalt psychology is that perceiving the whole of a 
stimulus is different or “other” to the sum of its parts [14]. 
That is, Gestaltists argue that hearing a car is qualitatively 
different from the experience of any of the single frequencies 
from which it is constructed, leading to the idea that the ad-
ditive computations performed by cognition in auditory per-
ception should not hold. Much success has been made in 
applying Gestalt-grouping principles to the auditory domain, 
such as in the work of Bergman’s auditory scene analysis 
[15] (see also [8]). However, these Gestalt-inspired ideas still 
largely fall within the discourse of a vertical worldview, with 
auditory gestalts and auditory streams being subject to the 
same status as auditory objects in ultimately being represen-
tations of the external world, which result from neural 
mechanisms [16, 17].  
Developed to naturalize or “ecologize” Gestalt psychol-
ogy ([18], p. 85), the writings of J. J. Gibson’s ecological 
psychology [19, 20] have provided another alternative way 
of theorizing about auditory perception. In antithesis to rep-
resentational mechanisms, ecological psychology treats per-
ception as the direct pick-up of richly structured environ-
mental information. This explanation bypasses the need for 
stimuli to be internally processed by cognition before  
perception is possible. With regards auditory perception par-
ticularly, it negates the need for acoustical input to be 
(re)organized, computed or parsed by (neuro)cognitive 
mechanisms (e.g. [8, 11]). Instead the theory of direct  
perception places meaning on how the changes in an acous-
tical input correspond to invariant properties of the changing 
environment [21-23]. This view of (auditory) perception, 
removes the need for explanations that hinge on mechanisms 
resting within the mind to do the ‘hard’ work of making per-
ceptions meaningful. With the dynamics environment al-
ready providing a rich and causal structure, meaningful per-
ceptions emerge on an equal plain between a perceiver and 
environment. They therefore only need to be “picked-up” or 
“detected”, not processed or computed. As a consequence of 
this, the ecological approach shifts our attention away from a 
vertical worldview toward a horizontal one [1, 2] where 
meaningful perceptions are an emergent effect of the dy-
namic interactions taking place between a perceiver and their 
environment ( - as opposed to meaningful perceptions 
emerging solely within the perceiver’s mind, made meaning-
ful through an anchoring to their past experiences).  
The aim of the present paper is to show how an ecologi-
cal conception of auditory perception can be useful in ex-
plaining not only how we obtain information about auditory 
environment but also, most pertinently, how we can also act 
with the environment. In the next section, we will review 
some of the main ideas and empirical findings regarding 
ecological acoustics (the ecological approach to auditory 
perception). Despite being an invaluable body of work in 
curating a direct account of auditory perception, we will ar-
gue that one main caveat of ecological acoustics has been its 
neglect for a key aspect of Gibson’s [19] landmark writings - 
the idea of affordances (the opportunities for action made 
available by the environment). We will argue, in line with 
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Gibson, that the meaning of an auditory perception should be 
defined in terms of the possible affordances that the sound 
offers us. The rest of the paper will involve putting forward 
the case of how the idea of auditory affordances can be 
made sense of in a way that encompasses the various types 
of behaviors that we engage in with the environment. We 
then argue that thinking of sounds as materials may be one 
way of accounting for this. We finish off the paper by briefly 
discussing some of the proposed metaphors implications in 
research and practice.  
SOUNDS IN THE WORLD 
Of the first to give full consideration to the idea of an 
ecological acoustics was William Gaver [21, 22]. Akin to 
Heidegger’s [13] conception of the “bare sound”, Gaver ar-
gued that the focus on sensation-like, low-level dimensions 
of an auditory event was an example of musical listening, 
where the primary focus of aural perceptions rests on the 
sound itself, such as focusing on the sounds changes in pitch 
and loudness. Like Heidegger, Gaver argued that whilst mu-
sical listening is certainly an available kind of listening we 
can engage in (with practice and the learning of cultural con-
ventions; see Thinking of sounds as materials section of this 
paper), it is an intellectual abstraction away from how we 
primarily perceive sounds in their immediacy as events in the 
world [21, 23]. Gaver argued that the most prevalent mode 
of listening we engage in is called everyday listening. For the 
listener, this mode of listening is concerned with the detec-
tion of the everyday things and happenings as they take place 
in the auditory environment. Essentially, this explanative 
turn from musical to everyday listening shifts focus away 
from the surface qualities of an auditory event (the bare sig-
nals of frequency, amplitude, etc.) to its structured causes. 
Listening is seen as an environment-orientated affair, with 
emphasis on how sounds can be used to inform a perceiver 
of the real-life things and events taking place around them. 
As such, when hearing an ecologically grounded auditory 
event we are less likely to describe it as a “pulse train of 
high-pitched, short duration sounds” than as “the sound of a 
glass breaking” [24]. In searching the literature, there are 
many examples of how auditory perception takes on this 
environment-orientated role. For example, from a young age 
we are able to correctly match everyday sounds to their eve-
ryday seen objects (see [25]). In adult listeners, reports and 
categorizations become more detailed still, with the materi-
als, actions and the tasks that sounds are involved in all be-
ing recognized and reported [26-28]. 
These experimental findings into the recognition and 
categorization of environmental sounds lie in stark contrast 
to a conventional, indirect notion of auditory perception. 
Rather than focusing on sensation-like elements of the sound 
itself, these findings suggest that auditory perception is much 
more concerned with trying to identify how these acoustic 
patterns relate to environmental sources and, in particular, 
the causal actions that produce them [27-29]. Attempting to 
advance his notion of everyday listening, Gaver [21] set out 
to provide a preliminary framework of how this could be the 
case. Foremost, this framework involved turning away from 
an account of auditory perception that depended on the in-
ner-processes of the mind (e.g. [11]) to an account that ex-
plained auditory perception as the result of a perceiver inter-
acting with the environment. Within Gaver’s account, 
sounds are the product of causal effects between the physical 
structure of objects and the unique modes of vibration they 
produce when excited by an external force [21, 22]. Assum-
ing the objects structure remains untransformed, it will al-
ways reliably transfer these patterns to the air surrounding it. 
Thus, for a perceiver, the auditory information provided by 
this event will retain invariance, due to the sounds causal 
dependence on the structure and dynamics of the environ-
mental objects and events that produced it. An environ-
mental event will always generate a structured distribution of 
acoustic energy, which will always reliably specify that event 
to the perceiver [30]. Importantly, this negates the need for 
the mechanics of cognition to intervene by adding meaning 
through the use of representations (e.g. [11]), as meaning is 
readily present in the environments rich structure and causal 
dynamics. This mutuality means that auditory perception can 
instead be explained as being direct [19, 20]. Consequently, 
it can also be argued that information does not need to be 
represented but rather differentiated by learning how the 
higher-order structure of the stimulation we receive invari-
antly relates to the parts of the environment we interact with 
[31, 32].  
Adopting this direct account of auditory perception, 
many researchers have begun to investigate how listeners are 
able to detect environmental properties from sound. One of 
the principle ways of doing this has been by asking partici-
pants to identify heard objects or to discriminate between 
different heard object properties. For example, it has been 
found that participants are readily able to tell to discriminate 
between the differences in size of otherwise identical objects 
(like a ball or steel rod) based solely on the sound they pro-
duce when dropped (e.g. [33-35]). Doing so has allowed 
researchers to understand the specifying variables partici-
pants use to perceive aspects of auditory events. Elsewhere, 
research has shown that listeners can perceive the geometric 
shape of an object from both radiant and reverberant audi-
tory information [36, 37] and that participants can also per-
ceive the relative distance of how far away a sounding ob-
jects is from them [38, 39]. Further still, people also seem to 
show keen ability to perceive the actions and attributes of 
other agents that may create an auditory event. Listeners 
have been to be able to identify a person’s emotion or gender 
from their footsteps and state whether or not a recorded 
sound was produced by themselves or by another person [26, 
29, 40-44]. These findings have validated the idea that lis-
teners are able to directly pick-up the structured auditory 
information from how it corresponds to the invariant interac-
tions of physical environmental forces.  
AUDITORY AFFORDANCES 
So, whilst cognitive explanations of auditory perception 
have argued our understanding of sound is dependent on the 
construction of mental representations, ecological acoustics 
has attempted to show us how the sounds we hear are al-
ready richly structured due to being a causal product of envi-
ronmental processes - negating the need for representation of 
auditory events altogether. However, despite this large shift 
in theoretical explanation, cognitive and ecological investi-
gations of auditory perception have remained starkly similar 
through the implementation of passive judgment style tasks 
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and experiments. In striving for an understanding of “the 
source event and its properties” ([30], p. 80), what has been 
left is a theory of auditory perception that is only well 
equipped enough to explain how we perceive information 
about an event [45]. Much less understood is how our per-
ceptions of sound can be used to guide our interactions with 
the environment, providing information for action [19, 45]. 
Essentially our argument is that whilst our perceptions need 
to be reliably informative of everyday events, they also need 
to be useful in this regard, providing information of the pos-
sible opportunities for action that are available. Indeed, these 
opportunities, or affordances as they are referred to, are pre-
cisely what most otherwise ecologically-driven accounts of 
auditory perception have left relatively implicit or ignored 
(e.g. [21, 22, 30]). Coined by J. J. Gibson [19], affordances 
are relational aspects of the environment that provide or fur-
nish possibilities for an agent to act [4, 46]. For example, for 
adult humans a staircase can afford stepping onto but for 
smaller children stairs may better afford climbing. In each 
instance, the same structured feature of the environment 
supports different patterns of activity in relation to the abili-
ties of each individual, regulating their behavior in different 
ways. As such, affordances are dependent upon both aspects 
of the environment and the abilities of an individual organ-
ism (within a form of life; [47]) in order to be perceived and 
used [4, 46] (see [48] for a classic example).  
Affordances are a much less discussed matter in the field 
auditory perception (with the exception of music, e.g.  
[49-52]). Of course, this does not mean that such affordances 
do not exist. An obvious example is hearing a car approach-
ing from behind (see [21] for a descriptive explanation). In 
such circumstances, identifying the sound as one being pro-
duced by a car is important to detect, but only insofar as in 
how it concurrently can provide other information more 
critical to the dynamics of the situation. In this instance, the 
information of the car approaching from behind affords mov-
ing or avoiding (see further below for an extended discussion 
of this example). Gibson [19] argued that in order for such 
information to guide action effectively, it needs to be consti-
tuted relationally, pointing both ways to agent and their envi-
ronment. As such, Gibson argued that the perception of in-
formation, was the perception of relationally defined affor-
dances [4, 19, 45]. However, by defining the role perceptual 
information as being for the specification of the sources and 
properties of a sound, ecological acoustics approaches (e.g. 
[21, 22, 30]) have placed the meaning and understanding of 
auditory events as residing one-sidedly in the structure of the 
environment [53]. In doing so, their approaches have failed 
to take into account how this auditory information is formed 
relationally, emerging with the situated activity of the agent. 
As a consequence of neglecting this Gibsonian characteriza-
tion of information, ecological acoustics and theories of af-
fordances are largely ontologically incompatible. Neverthe-
less, we argue that affordances need to be accounted for to 
have a truly ecological conception of everyday listening. 
Specifically, to understand sounds in an everyday context, 
we need to also consider how they are used to control or 
guide our actions effectively.  
Recent research is demonstrating that sounds do offer af-
fordances for action. Take the sound of a rolling ball as one 
example. Research has found that listeners can perceive the 
speed and size of a rolling ball (to some degree of accuracy, 
at least) [54]. Along the lines of an ecological acoustics ac-
count, this can be explained through (and modeled by emu-
lating) the sound-producing physics of the ball as it travels 
across a surface [55-57], providing structured information of 
the event. Recent research extends these findings, showing 
that the sound of a rolling ball can also offer sufficient affor-
dances for action. When set with the task of directly or indi-
rectly intercepting a rolling ball from its sound alone, par-
ticipants are able to perform very well if not perfectly  
[58, 59]. Likewise, whilst research has found that listeners 
can detect the size or material of an object from its resultant 
sound (e.g. [34, 60, 61]), this information can also be used to 
prospectively guide and influence aspects of listeners’ reach-
ing movements. For example, research has shown that hear-
ing a material associated with part of an object whilst reach-
ing for it, sways participants to grasp the part of the object 
that is congruent to the material they hear. [62]. Hearing 
other characteristics of objects such as their size has also 
been found to influence reaching movements. In one study 
conducted by Sedda, et al. [63] it was found that hearing the 
size of a dropped object had significant effects on the aper-
ture of peoples grip when they were asked to reach and grasp 
that object. It was found that hearing a larger object caused 
participants to open their hand more than when they heard a 
smaller object [63]. 
As well as information produced by environmental 
events being important for the control of action, sounds pro-
duced by (or related to) our own actions also seem afford 
uses for controlling behavior. For example, research has 
found the sound of footsteps to be a useful cue for guiding 
human actions. These self-produced sounds, resulting from 
the interaction between feet impacting the ground during 
locomotion have been found to be important as reafferences 
for action in long-jumping, with it being found that when 
time-delays were introduced between foot impacts and their 
resultant sounds, movement performance was disrupted [64]. 
Other studies, such as those conducted by Young, Rodger & 
Craig [44, 65] have found that hearing the recorded sounds 
of footsteps on gravel can provide sufficient information for 
participants to imitate the cadence and stride length of a 
model. Furthermore, it was found that these ecological 
sounds were able to significantly reduce variability in stride 
length for Parkinson’s disease patients [65]. Similarly, when 
participants are asked to synchronize their breaths to a sound 
stimulus, one study has found that the ecological sounds of 
human breathing produce more stable breathing durations 
when compared to artificially synthesized sounds [66].  
From the findings outlined above it seems clear that, 
rather than being passive receivers of information about the 
environment, we actively bring advantageous information 
into use to afford an adequate grip on the situation. Notably, 
when using auditory information for catching, grasping or 
acting in some other kind of way, how the information avail-
able corresponds to the material structure of the environment 
is of little concern. The latent content of a sound (i.e. its 
causes or “aboutness”) holds no utility in and of itself [45]. 
Instead, what is important is how this auditory information, 
in relation to an agent, can provide a more or less desirable 
state of affairs within their present context [6]. Essentially, 
what is of concern is the relevant uses that the auditory in-
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formation provides [45]. Indeed - much as Tim Ingold  
[2, 67] contends in relation to the use of materials when ma-
terials in making – we argue the meaning of an auditory 
event does not always arise from its invariant composition or 
structure but through the reliable uses and functionalities it 
provides in relation to the user. As such, the acoustic struc-
ture produced from an environmental event is better seen as 
being “brought into use” ([67] p. 352) by an agent for the 
coordination of perception and action (within the context of 
the task at hand).  
This idea of meaning arising with use, rather than resid-
ing in objective structure, can be demonstrated nicely with 
the earlier example of an approaching car. The sound of an 
approaching car is determined by its sound-producing me-
chanics, as it unfolds spatiotemporally in the environment, 
leading to dynamic increases in sound intensity and high-
frequency components as the car moves closer ([21, 68-71]). 
As mentioned, these looming sounds (where a sounding ob-
ject approaches a listeners point of observation) are generally 
associated with a undesirable state of affairs for an agent and 
will afford avoiding in most everyday circumstances (as 
generally found and inferred through anticipatory biases in 
judging time-to-contact/time-to-passage; e.g. [69, 71]). This 
is generally attributed to the dynamics of the looming sound 
“specify[ing] the arrival time of the source” ([72] p. 123), 
allowing for an agent to act prospectively in relation to the 
event. However, the idea that objective dimensions of a 
sound, like its increasing intensity and high frequency com-
ponents, hold information of arrival time – like as if pre-
designated with certain functionalities – seems like an erro-
neous attribution under the position advocated here.  
By describing sounds as being “brought into use”, as a 
relational interaction between agent and environment, the 
uses of a sound (i.e. the affordances it provides) should be 
treated as an emergent process. With situated and task-
directed activity of an agent, we argue that the same patterns 
of structured information the environment provides a multi-
tude of potential uses, depending on how this information 
becomes available in interaction with the situated activity of 
the individual. This is not to deny that, in most circum-
stances, an approaching sound will indicate a dangerous 
situation and invite the appropriate response of avoidance. It 
is merely to point out that for other users such sounds – like 
the sound of a looming car - can take on other resourceful 
roles for agents in controlling their behavior. For example, 
rather than being avoided, visually impaired people report 
the sounds of oncoming traffic as being their most used and 
useful auditory cues for wayfinding in urban environments 
[73]. Hearing moving cars and traffic can indicate the 
boundary from the road to the footpath and, as such, be used 
to walk in a straight line and avoid veering off onto a busy 
street [73]. When intentionally engaged in the task of naviga-
tion, the sounds of looming traffic are brought into use due to 
their reliability in invariantly indicating the layout of the urban 
environment. Moreover, this auditory affordance is not nor-
mally perceived in sighted individuals, given their visual ac-
cess to the same information. Hence, an agent’s perception of 
(and sensitivity to) possible affordances in aspects of the envi-
ronment will be driven in part by the suitability of the particu-
lar affordance to the task at hand, as well as being formed in 
relation to his or her individual sensitivities and skills.  
THINKING OF SOUNDS AS MATERIALS 
We believe the ways by which agents bring sounds pur-
posefully into use for tasks, like auditory wayfinding, is ac-
tually much the same as the way people and animals use 
materials in making. This idea of thinking of sounds as ma-
terials is perfectly summed up in the way Tim Ingold [67] 
describes how the male weaverbird builds its nest. As Ingold 
puts it, the weaverbird actively explores the environment 
choosing materials that afford use in the immanency of the 
task of building. Importantly, the materials it uses, like torn 
grass and leaves, are adopted into the task of building be-
cause of how their structure can support and contribute to the 
nests evolving form. Crucial to this, in Ingold’s eyes, is that 
the making of the nest “arises within the process of use, 
rather than disclosing what is, ideally if not materially, 
ready-made” ([67] p. 354). Analogously, as we have argued 
here, the affordances we detect from sound are immanent to 
our relevant use of them. It is through needing to navigate 
the urban environment that the sounds of cars emerge as an 
affordance for navigation, much like how through making a 
nest that a weaverbird discovers torn grass and leaves as use-
ful materials for nest building. In each instance, reliable 
causal properties of the material environment are employed 
into the unfolding trajectories of each organism’s journey as 
they interact with the environment.  
Importantly, using the word material to describe a sound 
avoids the talk of things like “objects” or representations of 
some kind that convey a detached, objectified view of how 
sounds come “ready-made” with meaning or functionalities. 
Talking of materials instead places agents within the form 
and meaning generating process as craftsmen, who work 
with their perceptions to act in the world. Affordances are 
born out of this unfolding process of environmental interac-
tion. Talking of a material environment [2, 32], in our view, 
emphasizes how the relationship between a using perceiver 
and structured environment provides a resourceful manifold 
of creative opportunities for action. Indeed, overall, it is a 
view that places discourse along a horizontal  plane [1, 2] by 
focusing explanation on how the temporally extended and 
situated activity of the agent forms basis for behavior. Par-
ticularly, in placing the emergence of meaning as a process 
of interaction and controlling behavior in the environment, it 
is an explanation that can bypass typical vertical accounts of 
behavior, that see the root to meaning as residing in the mind 
[1, 2, 6]. 
Taking the idea of sounds as materials further, we also 
want to point out that difference in ability, as well as being 
constituted by bodily capacities (like in the case of the visu-
ally impaired) or species-specific capacities (like for the 
weaverbird or human) are also influenced by sociocultural 
practices. In line with Rietveld & Kiverstein [47], we argue 
that perception and use of affordances is dependent on the 
sociocultural practices and skills that are available within a 
form of life. This is important to accommodate in thinking of 
sounds as materials as we can adopt causal aspects of the 
auditory environment into many forms of skilled practice 
like music, dance and language. Just as craftsmen from dif-
ferent forms of practice may find different uses in materials, 
we too as perceivers find different uses available to us in 
sound through the types of sociocultural practices in which 
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we learn and engage in. The metrical and syncopated 
rhythms of music generally seem to be privileged to the hu-
man form of life [74], with most people being able to syn-
chronize their taps to a regular beat [75, 76] and dance to 
music [77, 78]. These affordances are readily available due 
to their practiced uses in musical culture. However, whilst a 
Western listener may be able to tap out the beat of a standard 
4/4 rhythm found within the normal Western conventions of 
music, they may not possess the skills to do so for the unfa-
miliar rhythms of Balkan folk music ([79]; for another skill-
based example of using sound for action, see [80]). By not 
being familiar with the practices from which the mu-
sic/sounds are a part, the relevant affordance for synchroni-
zation cannot be detected. In this way, sounds can also be 
considered as being “sociomaterial”, as the material envi-
ronment is “sculpted by our sociocultural practices into a 
sociomaterial environment” ([47] p. 335). As a result our 
abilities and skills in being able to detect and use auditory 
affordances are grounded in these cultural factors as well. 
Even in the example of auditory wayfinding [73] (see 
above), the affordances provided by the sounds of traffic are 
dependent on the normative practice of road laws by the 
drivers and pedestrians participating in the urban environ-
ment.  
A particularly interesting example of how sound as mate-
rials can cut across traditionally separate boundaries of ex-
planation (physical, physiological, social, and cultural) is the 
worksong. Worksongs have been found throughout many 
different work and social groups [81, 82]. Often sung as a 
way of collectively airing grievances and transcending the 
monotony of the job at hand, singing songs was also a way 
of coordinating members amongst a group (for an experi-
mental example, see [83]). The general cultural conventions 
of rhythm and melody are brought into use, affording a col-
lective pace or tempo to which the work could be done. 
Whilst debatable, some recent findings from sport psychol-
ogy show music can be used as a way of coordinating action 
efficiently [84, 85], worksongs may have served the addi-
tional benefit of reducing energy consumption amongst the 
individuals of the group. Moreover though, what is most 
interesting to note is how these worksongs were “constituted 
in relation to the necessities of labour” ([82] p. 317). Far 
from being imposed on the working process, it seems that 
through the regular patterns of coordinated movement set by 
the task at hand, worksongs emerged as a part of the work 
process. Rather than the separate conventions of music and 
work being wedged onto one another, it seems the musical 
conventions available in the workers form of life potentiated 
the affordances of music making from the already audible 
and coordinated patterns of movement furnished by the labor 
process. For example, sailors would sing sea shanties that 
fitted the kind of tasks they were performing on deck – hav-
ing a song for hauling ropes and setting sails and another for 
heaving work [82]. Other tasks, like cutting and hammering, 
would integrate the thump of the tools into the pulse of the 
song, accompanied by the grunt of the workers as they 
swung [81]. The sounds of hammering, for example, can be 
interpreted as providing a means for forming the rhythm of a 
song, in turn affording singing and a way of keeping time 
amongst the larger group that, whilst not always possible 
through sight or touch, is afforded through the use of sound.  
With all this in mind, we feel the general sounds-as-
materials metaphor can provide a refreshing way of thinking 
about the matter of auditory perception. Indeed, it is a gen-
eral approach that can account for how we can act with 
sounds in many different creative ways. This is a particularly 
important point as affordances have not generally been given 
much consideration with regard to auditory phenomena and 
when they have it has usually only been in relation to music 
(e.g. [49-52]). This approach extends the scope of auditory 
affordances allowing for everyday tasks, like filling a glass 
of water using sound [86] to dancing with music (e.g. [78]) 
or auditory wayfinding [73] to be mutually accounted for. 
Indeed, these creative and improvisatory uses of the auditory 
environment are poorly accounted generally for within theo-
ries of sensorimotor interaction, which have tended to focus 
on very constrained interactions between action and sound 
(such as tapping to a metronome, see below).  
One way of accounting for audio-motor coordination that 
has become popular over the past decade has been by attrib-
uting this type of behavior to the mirror neuron system  
[87-89] or motor system generally (see [90]). According to 
these explanations, sounds are successfully perceived and 
interacted with by internally simulating the likely actions 
that produced them in the motor cortex (see [91] for a recent 
review in relation to music). Successful interaction from an 
agent therefore depends on learnt mappings between external 
events and internal representations of our own (and others) 
sound-actions effects. However, by relying on previously-
learnt models or representations of such sound-action effects, 
the novel and opportunistic uses of sound that emerge from 
agent-environment interactions are difficult to explain (see 
[6] for a full critique of the problem of meaning in informa-
tion processing approaches). For example, a person could 
walk in time to a regular clapping sound, even though ana-
tomically distinct neural regions would support the putative 
motor ‘representation’ of these events. By contrast, whilst 
the learning of skills and abilities do play a key role in think-
ing of sounds as materials, these learnt uses of environmental 
information are instead defined as mediating the potential 
forms of activity the organism can engage in rather than be-
ing the cause of that behavior per se. Therefore, the emer-
gence of meaningful auditory affordances, in our view is a 
skilled agent, purposefully engaged in the task at hand, ex-
ploring and bringing into use the opportunities made avail-
able by the (socio)material environment that can be used to 
support his or her behavior.  
APPLICATIONS 
We hope that by discussing the structure of auditory 
events, their relation to an intentional agent and in highlight-
ing how these relations are grounded in skilled forms of so-
ciocultural practice, we have illustrated how the auditory 
environment provides a rich and resourceful manifold of 
action opportunities. Particularly, we believe that in appreci-
ating how these different factors intersect in the emergence 
of affordances, important insights can be gained both em-
pirically and more broadly in practice. For example, in sen-
sorimotor synchronization research (see [75, 76] for exten-
sive reviews), coordination with sensory stimuli is conven-
tionally studied by asking participants to tap along an audi-
tory isochronous metronome (usually consisting of a short 
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noise burst or clicking sound). How people synchronize to 
these stimuli are well understood and have been mathemati-
cally modeled in the forms of the Wing & Kristofferson 
model for continuation tapping [92] and the Vorberg and 
Wing model for synchronization [93]. However, within this 
line of study, how the sounds interact with and support the 
synchronization behavior of the participant is rarely ac-
counted for and cannot be handled by models like the Vor-
berg and Wing model (c.f. [94]; see [95] for continuation 
tapping). Instead, metronomes are often treated as a way of 
arbitrarily demarcating time points for participants’ tap on-
sets. Nevertheless, the dynamic structure of a metronome can 
have significant effects on movement performance. For ex-
ample, Rodger & Craig [96] found significant changes in the 
average kinematics of participants’ movements when mov-
ing to continuous sounds (like a pitch glide) and discrete 
sounds (i.e. a metronome), with continuous sounds shown to 
support smoother and more harmonic movements (i.e. that 
are more like the smooth oscillating motion of a pendulum) 
than discrete, metronomic sounds [96] (see also: [97-99]). 
These findings give credence to the idea that by having dif-
ferent auditory structures available during the performance 
of a goal-directed task (e.g. to be perfectly in time with the 
metronome stimuli; [96]), different affordances will emerge 
in support of behavior.  
For these reasons, it will be important to understand how 
motor-timing unfolds not only with reference to a metro-
nome or sound event (as is often stated) but also in relation 
to it, with a perceiver’s skills and task-directedness ground-
ing the potential affordances that the sounds provide. Indeed, 
findings from judgment tasks suggest that by changing the 
task participants are asked to do, the auditory cues they use 
in informing their judgments will also change [100]. How 
task and context affect our use of auditory affordances in 
movement-based tasks is, to-date, an open question for study 
and one we hope to investigate in the future. Furthermore, 
whilst differences in skill between musicians and non-
musicians in timing behavior have been examined (see [75]), 
it will be interesting to see how these skills influence the 
selection of auditory affordances available in time-keeping 
tasks and how a person’s audio-motor dexterity or cultural 
learning may transfer to other contexts detached from where 
they usually take place. 
Other research has found that environmentally represen-
tative and action-relevant sounds, like the sound of footsteps, 
can also influence the control of participants’ walking 
movements. For example, research has found that partici-
pants can reenact the walking patterns of a model by using 
only the sounds of footsteps on gravel [44] and that hearing 
our footsteps as though they are walking along different ma-
terials (like snow or concrete), whilst walking on a treadmill, 
can modulate subsequent measures of forward drift [101]. 
Applied to patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD), these 
footstep sounds have been successfully used to encourage 
more healthy patterns of gait, improving the spatial variabil-
ity of patients stride length and encouraging a more regular 
cadence in line with healthy controls when compared to the 
use of a simple metronome [65]. Similarly, the sound of a 
rolling ball has been found as useful information for PD pa-
tients in controlling their kinematics in reaching to intercept 
it [58]. Findings like these provide hope for new ways that 
sounds can be used and in the different types of tasks or con-
texts, like sport or movement rehabilitation. They also open 
up the door to new types of sound design techniques based 
on physical modeling of environmental sound sources that 
can be used for new types of tasks (e.g. [57, 102, 103]). Par-
ticularly, the sounds as materials metaphor may be useful 
here in guiding and understanding this design process, allow-
ing greater refinement and development of sounds that can 
be implemented, by appreciating how design interacts rela-
tionally with the skills of a user [2, 47]. In summary, think-
ing of sounds as materials opens up many new pathways of 
empirical and theoretical discussion, which will hopefully be 
enlightening and also useful more broadly in sound design 
and applied contexts like movement rehabilitation.  
CONCLUSION 
The argument put forward in this paper has been that to 
fully understand auditory perception as a meaningful proc-
ess, it is not appropriate to look at sounds as auditory repre-
sentations of some kind, nor is it sufficient to see the envi-
ronment as transmitting or specifying meaning as a latently 
available part of its structure. Rather, we argue that meaning 
and use needs to be understood as relationally grounded 
process between an agent and their environment. Impor-
tantly, to appreciate these relations we need to consider the 
agent as skillful and intentional, as well as being socially- 
and culturally-situated. The examples from different forms 
of practice, such as music, worksong or urban wayfinding, 
show that the auditory environment can afford many differ-
ent possibilities for action, supporting a rich variety of be-
haviors (providing an agent has the ability to use them). By 
thinking of sounds as materials, these rich possibilities can 
be accounted for in a way that does not need to ontologically 
separate the physical (putatively ‘objective’) aspects of 
sound from the (putatively ‘subjective’) aspects of the agent. 
Furthermore, we believe that in adopting this way of think-
ing, research into applications of auditory guides/sonification 
for enhancing movement performance in different contexts, 
such as sport or rehabilitation, may be fruitfully advanced.  
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